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The largest outbreak of severe acute respiratory syn-
drome (SARS) struck Beijing in spring 2003. Multiple
importations of SARS to Beijing initiated transmission in
several healthcare facilities. Beijing’s outbreak began
March 5; by late April, daily hospital admissions for SARS
exceeded 100 for several days; 2,521 cases of probable
SARS occurred. Attack rates were highest in those 20–39
years of age; 1% of cases occurred in children <10 years.
The case-fatality rate was highest among patients >65
years (27.7% vs. 4.8% for those 20–64 years, p < 0.001).
Healthcare workers accounted for 16% of probable cases.
The proportion of case-patients without known contact to a
SARS patient increased significantly in May.
Implementation of early detection, isolation, contact tracing,
quarantine, triage of case-patients to designated SARS
hospitals, and community mobilization ended the outbreak.
B
y July 4, 2003, a total of 8,439 probable cases and 812
deaths from severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) had been identified from 30 countries (URL:
http://www.who.int/csr/sars/en/). A novel coronavirus
(SARS-CoV) was found to be the cause of this multicoun-
try outbreak (1–3). Most cases of SARS occurred in China,
where the virus apparently emerged first, most likely from
animal sources. The largest outbreak of SARS occurred in
Beijing. 
In Beijing, the SARS outbreak was reported in April
2003, against a backdrop of earlier outbreaks detected in
Guangdong, Hong Kong (4,5), Hanoi, Toronto (6), and
Singapore (7). In contrast to Toronto, where the entire out-
break originated from a single importation (6), Beijing’s
outbreak involved multiple distinct imported cases, and
transmission from index cases was amplified within sever-
al healthcare facilities. Widespread transmission came
under control after Beijing municipal authorities aggres-
sively implemented measures to enhance detection, isolate
case-patients, and trace contacts to minimize further oppor-
tunities for transmission in community and institutional
settings. This report summarizes the descriptive epidemiol-
ogy of Beijing’s outbreak and the emergency interventions
that were implemented to control the local situation.
Methods
Setting 
Beijing municipality has an estimated population of
13.8 million and includes 14 districts and four counties.
Approximately 85,000 healthcare workers live there.
Disease reporting and epidemic investigations of reported
cases were conducted through the collaboration of the
Beijing Center for Prevention and Disease Control and dis-
trict centers within Beijing, using guidelines for surveil-
lance and case investigation issued by China’s Ministry of
Health.
Case Definitions 
China established a case definition for “infectious atyp-
ical pneumonia,” also termed SARS, with minor modifica-
tions implemented during the course of the outbreak. After
May 3, probable (“clinically confirmed”) and suspected
cases were defined according to 1) epidemiologic history
(either contact with other SARS patients or exposure to a
SARS-affected area); 2) symptoms and signs of fever and
respiratory illness; 3) normal or decreased leukoctye
count; 4) chest radiograph abnormalities; and 5) absence of
substantial improvement with antibiotic treatment (Table
1). We have included cases reported as probable according
to the case definition in place at the time of report, consis-
tent with a strategy used by other investigators (8).
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When a possible case-patient is identified in a health-
care facility within Beijing, a panel of experts at the facil-
ity reviews clinical information to classify the illness as
probable, suspected, or under observation. Case classifica-
tion is updated on the basis of clinical progression and
availability of alternative diagnoses to account for the ill-
ness, although diagnostic testing for other agents was not
extensive during most of the epidemic. During May, clini-
cal experts were dispatched to SARS hospitals to improve
how consistently cases were classified according to the
national case definition. For probable and suspected cases,
healthcare providers complete a standard report form,
which is faxed to the relevant district center for disease
control. A district epidemic investigator then interviews
the patient (or family member) and completes a standard-
ized epidemic investigation form regarding demographic
and clinical data, as well as the patient’s contacts within
the 2 weeks before symptom onset, in an attempt to iden-
tify the patient’s source of infection. The district is respon-
sible for identifying persons who had contact with the
patient between the onset of symptoms and hospitalization.
Those who had close contact are placed under home med-
ical observation by community health center personnel and
are quarantined to restrict their circulation in the broader
community. 
Laboratory Testing
Serum was collected from patients at certain hospitals
for detection of anti–SARS-CoV antibodies by using one
of two locally developed enzyme-linked immunosorbent
assay (ELISA) kits; one was developed by the Beijing
Genomics Institute in partnership with the Academy of
Military Medical Sciences, and the other was developed by
the China Center for Disease Control. SARS-CoV was
also isolated from selected clinical specimens; substantial
partial genome sequencing for four Beijing strains
(AY278488, AYAY278487, AY278490, and AY279354)
was submitted to GenBank  April 17–April 19, 2003, by E.
Qin et al. from the Academy of Military Medical Sciences
and the Beijing Genomics Institute in Beijing. Details on
laboratory tests are reported separately (9,10).
Data Analysis
Data were entered into either a Microsoft Excel data-
base (case report forms) or an Oracle database (detailed
epidemiologic investigation forms). Data analysis used
SPSS (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL) software. Chi-square or,
when appropriate, Fisher exact test was used for compari-
son of proportions. Because date of onset was missing for
985 (26.8%) of the 3,665 patients with probable and sus-
pected cases reported through May 20, we present tempo-
ral information based on date of hospitalization, which was
missing in 155 (4.2%) of case-patients. 
Results
Importation Phase 
The earliest cases in Beijing occurred in persons who
were infected with SARS in Guangdong and Hong Kong. 
Index Case 1
The first apparent case of SARS in Beijing was identi-
fied on March 5 in a 27-year-old businesswoman in whom
symptoms developed on February 22 while she was travel-
ing in Guangdong (Figure 1). She sought medical attention
in Shanxi Province, where SARS subsequently developed
in two doctors and a nurse who cared for her. After she
returned to Beijing, she was hospitalized in a military hos-
pital, then transferred to an infectious disease hospital.
SARS developed in 10  healthcare workers exposed at the
two Beijing hospitals as well as 8 of the patient’s family
members and close colleagues or friends. Both of the
patient’s parents died from SARS. Healthcare workers
cared for the patient before SARS was suspected and used
no personal protective equipment.
Index Case 2
A 72-year-old man visited a relative in Hong Kong’s
Prince of Wales Hospital, and symptoms developed on
March 14, 2003. On March 15, the patient flew from Hong
Kong to Beijing on China Air flight 112. He was evaluat-
ed in one hospital on arrival in Beijing but was not admit-
ted. The next day, his family brought him to a second
Beijing hospital, where after a successful resuscitation in
the emergency department, he was admitted to the hospi-
tal. He died there on March 20. Contact tracing and epi-
demic investigation suggest that at least 59 SARS cases in
Beijing can be traced back to this patient, including illness
in three members of his immediate family, in six of seven
healthcare workers who assisted in the emergency room
resuscitation, and in one other healthcare worker in the
facility. The remaining cases occurred in other patients and
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Table 1. Case definition for severe acute respiratory syndrome 
(infectious atypical pneumonia) in China as of May 3, 2003 
Category  Criteria
a 
Probable  1.1+ 2 + 4, or 
1.1+2+4+5, or 
1.2+2+3+4 
Suspected  1.1+2+3, or 
1.2+2+4, or 
2+3+4 
Under medical observation  1.2+2+3 
a1. Epidemiologic history: 1.1:Having close contact with a patient, or being a 
member of infected cluster, or having infected other persons; 1.2: Having visited 
or resided in cities or areas where SARS cases were reported with secondary 
transmission during the 2 weeks before onset of disease. 2. Symptoms and signs of 
febrile respiratory illness. 3. Normal or decreased leukocyte count. 4. Chest x-ray 
changes. 5. Lack of response to antibiotic treatment. 
 their contacts. In addition to Beijing cases, transmission on
this airplane flight has been linked to SARS cases in other
areas, including Taiwan and Inner Mongolia. Besides these
two index case-patients, several later SARS case-patients
in Beijing had traveled to other affected areas before the
onset of clinical symptoms.
Amplification in Healthcare Facilities
SARS occurred in healthcare workers in >70 hospitals
throughout Beijing, and clusters of >20 probable SARS
cases among healthcare workers occurred in four Beijing
hospitals (Figure 2). Apparent transmission of SARS with-
in fever clinics and selected hospitals prompted closure of
four hospitals and numerous fever clinics. One large hos-
pital, where 41 probable cases occurred among healthcare
workers and numerous cases occurred among patients and
contacts, was closed on April 23. SARS patients were
transferred to designated SARS hospitals, and the remain-
ing patients, staff, and visitors were quarantined in the hos-
pital for 2 weeks. 
Evolution of Outbreak 
Through June 2003, a total of 2,521 patients with prob-
able cases of SARS were hospitalized in Beijing. The out-
break peaked during the 3rd and 4th weeks in April, when
hospitalizations for probable SARS exceeded 100 cases
for several days, and an increased proportion of case-
patients reported having no known contact with a SARS
patient (Figure 1).
Description of Cases
Of 2,521 probable SARS cases in Beijing, 2,444
(96.7%) cases reported by May 20 had data available for
review and constitute the remainder of this report. Of the
2,444 probable case-patients, 1,009 (41.3%) had a history
of close contact with a patient with SARS; 395 (16.2%) of
the probable cases occurred in healthcare workers.
Overall, 42.9% of probable case-patients had no previous
contact with a SARS case-patient or travel to affected
areas outside Beijing. However, the proportion of probable
case-patients with no direct contact with a SARS patient
increased from 50.7% for case-patients who were hospital-
ized before May 1, to 75.2% for those admitted to hospi-
tals in May (p < 0.001). Among probable SARS case-
patients who were hospitalized in March and April, health-
care workers accounted for 18.7% (n = 329), compared
with 10.7% (n = 61) for case-patients who were hospital-
ized on May 1 or thereafter (p < 0.001).
The demographic characteristics of case-patients with
probable SARS are shown in Table 2. Children <10 years
of age accounted for 0.9% of probable cases, and the medi-
an age of those who became ill was 33 years. Age-specific
attack rates were highest in those 20–39 years of age (rel-
ative risk [RR] 1.7, 95% confidence interval (CI) 1.53 to
1.89, compared with those 40–64 years, and significantly
lower in children (1–4 years of age, RR 0.12 [CI 0.05 to
0.28], 5–9 years, RR 0.17 [CI 0.09 to 0.31] and 10–19
years, RR 0.53 [CI 0.44 to 0.64], compared with those
aged 40–64 years). Overall, male patients had similar rates
as female patients, but the risk differed significantly in cer-
tain age groups: among those 10–19 years of age, the RR
for SARS in male patients was 1.96, 95% CI 1.36 to 1.83,
compared with that of females; and in those >75 years,
RR for male patients was 1.88 (95% CI 1.08 to 3.29)
(Figure 3). The attack rate for probable SARS among
healthcare workers in Beijing is estimated as 465 per
100,000. Consistent with the case definitions in use in
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Figure 1.Epidemic curve—severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) probable case-patients by date of hospitalization and type
of exposure, Beijing, 2003. Open bars indicate nonhealthcare
workers without contact with a SARS patient; dark bars (“1.1”) indi-
cate nonhealthcare workers with contact with a SARS patient; light
filled bars indicate healthcare workers.
Figure 2. Clusters of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)
cases among healthcare workers in four hospitals, Beijing 2003.Beijing during the outbreak, chest x-ray changes were evi-
dent in >85% of probable case-patients. As of May 20, the
case-fatality rate was 6.4% for probable SARS case-
patients. Case-fatality rates increased with age (0.5% in
<20 year olds; 4.8% for those 20–64 years; and 27.7% for
>65 years of age, p < 0.001). By June 16, 2003, a total of
190 deaths among 2,521 probable SARS case-patients
were reported from Beijing, and 2,053 patients had been
discharged from the hospital. The case fatality rate among
probable case-patients, excluding those still hospitalized,
was 8.4%.
According to clinical information available on the case
investigation form, nearly all SARS case-patients had the
initial symptom of fever, and many had a cough (44.2%),
but only 11.0% had diarrhea. Mean leukocyte count on
admission was 5.5 x 109/L, and 25.2% had leukocyte
counts <4.0 x 109/L(the normal limit).
For the 1,009 probable SARS case-patients with report-
ed contact with another SARS patient, the most recent date
of such contact was collected; 595 of these patients had
onset dates available, permitting approximation of the
shortest possible incubation period. Among these patients,
a mean of 7.8 days (median 6) occurred from most recent
exposure to onset of symptoms. 
Control Measures
Prompted by the rapid expansion of the epidemic from
April 16 to April 19, the Beijing Municipal Government
established a Joint SARS Leading Group to oversee crisis
management through 10 task forces. The medical and pub-
lic health task force set up an emergency command center
on April 24 and organized fever clinics for triage, designat-
ed SARS areas within hospitals for isolation and special-
ized care, provided personal protective equipment and
training for healthcare workers, and introduced communi-
ty-based prevention and control through case detection,
isolation, quarantine, and community mobilization. To
reduce transmission within healthcare settings, Beijing
authorities issued protocols for triage, isolation, case man-
agement, and administrative controls, which prohibited
visitors to hospitals and separated patients who were under
medical observation or suspected of having SARS from
areas with other patients. 
The medical emergency command center included
teams for clinical diagnosis and treatment, critical care,
patient transport, infection control, and information man-
agement. Local shortages of isolation rooms, intensive care
facilities, and hospital beds were addressed by dispatching
specially equipped ambulances to transfer SARS patients to
designated facilities. An anticipated shortage of hospital
beds for care and isolation of SARS patients prompted
authorities to construct a new 1,000-bed hospital in 8 days. 
On April 27, all patients with probable cases of SARS
were moved to designated areas within hospitals. At one
point, 27 municipal and 21 district hospitals were provid-
ing care to SARS patients. On May 8, 2003, the medical
and public health task force finished concentrating all the
probable case-patients into 16 designated municipal hospi-
tals, with 30 district hospitals providing care for patients
with suspected SARS. More than 60 fever clinics were
established throughout the city to triage patients with acute
febrile illness, permitting prompt isolation of patients who
required further observation and referral to the appropriate
level of care to rule out SARS. By June 19, 2003, a total of
30,172 people who had had close contact with probable or
suspected SARS case-patients had been quarantined sepa-
rately or in groups for 2 weeks after their last exposure to
a SARS case-patient.
In addition to interventions directed at managing
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Table 2. Characteristics of probable cases of severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS) in Beijing, 2003 
Characteristic
a  Probable case-patients;  N (%) 
Demographic  
Male sex  1,217/2,406 (50.6) 
Age (y)   
1–4  6/2,397 (0.2) 
5–9  17/2,397 (0.7) 
10–19  165/2,397 (6.9) 
20–39  1,270/2,397 (53.0) 
40–64  733/2,397 (30.6) 
65–74  147/2,397 (6.1) 
>75  59/2,397 (2.5) 
Median age (range)  33 (1–93) 
Fatal outcome  156/2,444 (6.4) 
Healthcare worker  395/2,444 (16.2) 
Admission symptoms   
Fever  1,646/1,693 (97.2) 
Cough   749/1,693 (44.2) 
Difficulty breathing  166/1,693 (9.8) 
Chest tightness  331/1,693 (19.6) 
Diarrhea  189/1,693 (11.2) 
aInformation was not available for the sex of 38 probable case-patients and for the 
age of 47 probable case-patients reported through May 20. 
Figure 3. Attack rates (cases per 100,000 population) by age and
sex of probable severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS),
Beijing 2003. patients, their contacts, and healthcare facilities, schools
were closed, travel was restricted, the community was edu-
cated about seeking care at designated sites, and tempera-
tures were monitored at frequent check points. Service
professionals were required to wear masks, and many
community members donned masks as well.
Laboratory Confirmation 
SARS-CoV was isolated from many patients in Beijing,
and sequences from four Beijing isolates (source:
GenBank) were compared with strains from other areas
(11). The cause of infection was confirmed for a series of
patients with severe illness who were cared for at Ditan
Hospital, by using an ELISA developed by the China
Center for Disease Control. Among 164 case-patients with
probable SARS (who had severe illness) tested by mid-
May, 98% had SARS-CoV–specific immunoglobulin (Ig)
G detected from samples collected >35 days after illness
onset; 55% had SARS-CoV–specific IgG detected 16–21
days after symptom onset, and 82% by 22 to 28 days after
illness onset. 
Discussion
Beijing experienced the largest outbreak of SARS yet
recognized. The disease was transported to Beijing by
multiple travelers. One case-patient originated in
Guangdong and transported the virus to Shanxi along the
way, and a second case-patient appears to have acquired
the virus during a hospital visit in Hong Kong. He then
transmitted the virus to other travelers encountered while
he had symptoms on the return airline flight to Beijing and
to those he came into contact with in a hospital in Beijing.
The imported cases initiated cascades of illness among the
family members, healthcare workers, and other hospital-
ized patients. Patients seeking care in multiple facilities
and clinicians failing to recognize nonspecific respiratory
symptoms as indications for isolation and use personal
protective equipment permitted the efficient transmission
of the virus to numerous healthcare workers, patients, and
others throughout Beijing. 
Amplification of transmission in healthcare settings
was likely enhanced by resuscitation of one of the index
patients in an emergency department. Since SARS patients
were initially cared for on general medical wards, the virus
was transmitted to other patients hospitalized for unrelated
conditions; such persons may be more vulnerable to infec-
tion as well as severe outcomes (8,12,13). Designation of
SARS wards and later specialized SARS hospitals facili-
tated control of transmission within healthcare settings in
Beijing. However, the delay before these steps were taken
permitted numbers of infected persons to increase in
healthcare settings, which likely permitted transmission to
community members through visits to hospitals, before
such visits were stopped and strict isolation measures
observed. 
Classifying patients as having probable or suspected
SARS may be difficult with the current case definitions.
Although a novel coronavirus was rapidly discovered as
the cause of SARS, this disease appeared to both clinicians
and public health workers as a nonspecific clinical syn-
drome. The clinical features have substantial overlap with
those caused by common respiratory viruses and bacteria.
Implementation of the case definition on the basis of non-
specific clinical features was particularly challenging in
areas with community transmission, since the ability to
focus surveillance and isolation efforts on persons with
epidemiologic links to specific travel or contact with other
SARS patients was no longer appropriate. Although the
case definition used by China included some components
to enhance specificity (i.e., normal or low leukocyte count,
lack of response to antibiotics), the definition remains non-
specific. Future surveillance and case management will
benefit greatly from incorporating laboratory tests, partic-
ularly if sufficiently sensitive laboratory methods can be
developed which are amenable to point-of-care use early in
the clinical course. In the meantime, available assays for
SARS-CoV, including ELISA and polymerase chain reac-
tion testing, will be valuable complements to epidemiolog-
ic surveillance for understanding recent disease patterns.
Elimination of SARS as a public health threat will require
major commitment to laboratory testing of possible case-
patients.
The age-specific attack rates of SARS in Beijing sup-
port findings from other outbreaks of SARS. High rates
among those 20–39 years of age likely reflect disease
among healthcare workers with occupational exposures,
and high rates in the elderly may represent patients with
nosocomial acquisition. The extremely low rate observed
in children in Beijing is noteworthy. Pediatric cases of
SARS have also been relatively rare in other countries
(14), but since most other outbreaks remained concentrat-
ed at healthcare facilities, this pattern could simply reflect
limited exposure to ill patients, thought to be the most effi-
cient transmitters. Given the size of Beijing’s outbreak and
the spread beyond hospitals, absence of exposure is unlike-
ly to fully account for the low incidence of SARS in chil-
dren. Whether asymptomatic or mild infection is more
likely to develop in children, and whether children are able
to transmit the virus to others in the absence of clinical ill-
ness, are important questions which must be addressed to
guide control. 
The steep increase in cases of SARS in late April posed
a major challenge to Beijing’s healthcare and public health
systems. The magnitude of ill healthcare workers, incident
cases, and affected facilities necessitated a strategic
response. Shortages of beds and isolation rooms, as well as
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ignation of selected hospitals for SARS patients; the prepa-
ration of special protocols for care, isolation, and health-
care worker protection; and ultimately, the construction of
a large new facility to ensure that capacity could keep up
with projected demand. More than 30,000 persons were
placed under quarantine. Maintaining adequate case inves-
tigation challenged local public health staff, and the rela-
tively high proportion of cases with no reported contact
with a SARS patient may reflect limitations in the methods
of identifying exposures during the epidemic’s peak, rather
than the absence of an identifiable source in all of these
cases. We are reevaluating potential sources of SARS
among patients initially reported to have no contact with a
SARS patient (15). Given the nonspecific case definition,
some of these patients may not have been infected with
SARS-CoV, and we are also further evaluating this possi-
bility. By restricting community gatherings and travel,
closing schools and entertainment venues, major reduc-
tions in social contact also may have contributed to slow-
ing transmission. The time from symptom onset to hospi-
talization became shorter during the course of the response
efforts (before April 21, median 6 days vs. median 2 days
thereafter); faster recognition of the condition and isola-
tion of patients were likely factors in bringing the epidem-
ic under control. Because multiple interventions were
instituted simultaneously, distinguishing the effectiveness
of isolation and quarantine measures from the impact of
broader measures implemented for the general community
will be difficult. Nevertheless, evaluation of several of
these efforts is in progress.
A principal lesson learned from the Beijing experience
is the importance of rapid response to SARS. Early detec-
tion of patients and prompt isolation can limit transmission,
and adherence to personal and administrative infection con-
trol measures can reduce opportunities for transmission
within healthcare facilities. The resources needed to
respond to simultaneous outbreaks in multiple hospitals and
address community transmission are much greater than
those required for individual case investigation or manage-
ment. Communities seeking to prepare for SARS must be
alert to the speed with which one imported case can lead to
dozens or hundreds of transmission chains. Thus a strong
system of early detection and open communication will
facilitate prompt recognition of possible problems and
immediate response measures. Addressing community con-
cerns, including fear of attending fever clinics or stigma
associated with having one’s neighborhood quarantined,
should be an important component of planning efforts.
The Beijing epidemic has many features in common
with those experienced elsewhere, including the dispropor-
tionate impact on healthcare workers and amplification of
disease in hospitals. The pattern of transmission is consis-
tent with droplet or contact spread. The apparent success of
infection control, isolation, contact tracing, and quarantine
in bringing the outbreak under control is encouraging, par-
ticularly because these efforts were introduced later in the
epidemic in Beijing than in some other settings. Whether
features particular to Beijing had a major influence on the
evolution or characteristics of the outbreak is not yet clear.
Careful clinical assessments of patients cared for during
the outbreak will be valuable, since in addition to steroids
and antiviral drugs, traditional Chinese medicine was fre-
quently used in caring for SARS patients. Whether treat-
ment strategies might be responsible for the lower age-spe-
cific case-fatality ratios in Beijing compared with reports
from other places is not yet known, and the lower case-
fatality ratio may derive in part from the nonspecific case
definition with resulting misclassification of some pneu-
monias of other causes as probable SARS. While popula-
tion density might have made the outbreak more difficult
to control in Beijing, the massive and efficient mobiliza-
tion of communities and health workers to respond to the
outbreak was likely an asset. 
In the response to SARS, opportunities exist for ensur-
ing broad public health benefits. A stronger public health
infrastructure capable of improved preparedness and
response to SARS will also improve control of other dis-
eases. Strengthening infection control practices to prevent
repeated introductions of SARS epidemics is likely to
reduce other healthcare-associated infections. Like other
emerging infectious diseases, SARS has demonstrated the
importance of enhanced communication between disparate
geographic regions and diverse sectors of society. 
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